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Abstract: 
 
Previous research generally ignores the costs of international cooperation. Using the 
principal-agent framework, we draw attention to the agency loss that occurs domestically 
when multiple international actors simultaneously influence national policy makers. We 
contribute to the literature by emphasizing the potentially negative consequences of 
competition between international organizations and citizens for influence over domestic 
politicians. Drawing upon previous theoretical and empirical work on the multiple-
principals-common-agent problem, we hypothesize that the joint influence of a country’s 
memberships in multiple international governmental organizations (IGOs) generates 
consistent, unintended, disruptive effects on governance. The empirical part of the paper 
applies our theoretical expectations to indicators of the quality of domestic governance. 
The results support our argument and show that the disruptive effect is strongest in less 
democratic countries. 
  
Previous research has linked the activities of international actors to improved 
domestic governance (Waltz 1999) in a wide variety of areas including better human 
rights practices (Hafner-Burton 2009; Simmons 2009), stricter environmental standards 
(Frank, Hironak and Schofer, 2000; Spilker 2012), better public health (Clavier and de 
Leeuw 2013), improved government transparency (Grigorescu 2003), and 
democratization (Mansfield and Pevehouse, 2006). In all of these studies international 
actors, multilateralism, and increased global connections of all kinds are theorized as 
positively affecting domestic governance The prevailing account in the literature is that 
forces of globalization and international cooperation could promote conditions for better 
domestic governance and lock politicians into policies necessary to improve economic 
and social outcomes (Bauhr and Nasiritousi 2012). Here we emphasize that there also are 
important and often-overlooked costs associated with international cooperation. In our 
theoretical framework, international cooperation creates a trade-off between gaining 
capacity and losing domestic accountability.  
Some recent empirical studies also emphasize the downside of international 
influence on domestic governance, especially in developing nations. First, there is the 
criticism of the effectiveness of foreign aid by prominent economists who argue that aid 
can undermine incentives for better governance in developing nations.1 With increases of 
aid, political accountability of domestic politicians to their own citizens declines (Knack 
2001; Knack and Rahman 2007). Second, the effectiveness of conditionality 
underpinning international aid packages and development assistance has been called into 
question (Abouharb and Cingranelli 2007; Smith 2007).  Third, recent scholarship has 
concluded that the effect of joining a particular international organization on domestic 
governance depends upon which other states are members. If the other members of an 
IGO are well governed, the governance effects on new members will be positive. 
                                                        
1 For a review of this literature, see Bourguignon and Sundberg (2007). 
Otherwise, the effects could be negative (Greenhill 2010, 2015; Mansfield and 
Pevehouse, 2006). Thus, the extant literature suggests that, under some circumstances, 
the activities of international actors and memberships in some IGOs may not contribute 
to better domestic governance in developing nations.  
We also question the idea that increased engagement with international 
organizations always or at least usually tends to improve domestic governance. Instead, 
we focus on the potentially negative effects of participation in international governmental 
organizations (IGO) on governance. We draw upon previous theoretical and empirical 
work on the multiple-principals-common-agent problem to hypothesize that the joint 
influence of a country’s memberships in multiple international governmental 
organizations  generates consistent, unintended, and disruptive effects on governance. In 
our theoretical framework, the more successful specific international actors are in 
influencing national governments, and the larger the number of actors influencing a 
particular country, the larger the negative effect on domestic governance.  
We do not argue that international governmental organizations intend to cause 
harm for or take advantage of some of their members. The negative effect on domestic 
governance we identify is an externality or unintended consequence of multiple 
international actors seeking to influence national governments.  Even if we assume that 
joining any particular IGO is beneficial for all member states, the competing demands of 
multiple IGO memberships would undermine the quality of their domestic governance. 
We emphasize the costs associated with international cooperation: increased activities of 
the IGOs unintentionally make it more difficult for citizens to control political 
incumbents. This loss in domestic accountability is more significant in less democratic 
countries, where citizens have fewer institutional mechanisms for rewarding or punishing 
their politicians. 
There is a theoretical debate over whether to treat IGOs as principals or as agents 
of the states that created them (Dreher and Jensen 2007). Consistent with Koremenos, 
Lipson and Snidal (2001:762), we view IGOs “as explicit arrangements, negotiated 
among international actors, that prescribe, proscribe, and/or authorize behavior.” We 
argue that IGOs act as new principals or as “would be principals” competing for the 
attention of domestic politicians; that is, over time they seek to become accepted as 
principals (Keohane 2003: 140). Developing countries typically have had no role or a 
limited role in creating most of the international organizations to which they belong. 
Even for more developed countries, once created, IGOs issue demands on the member 
states that were unanticipated at the time of creation. For example, consider the demands 
of the European Union on its current members, which, according to some British 
politicians, were strong and disruptive enough to warrant leaving.  
The premise of our argument is that as international organizations become more 
influential over time, they can more efficiently sanction or reward the policy choices of 
domestic politicians. Thus, they increasingly act as principals competing with citizens for 
the attention of national politicians. In theory, the disruptive effects of IGO membership 
on domestic governance should occur for all states, but we expect them to be strongest 
for less democratic countries.  
We also expect the negative effects on domestic governance to be greatest for 
states that have relatively more IGO memberships. We draw attention to the problem 
created when many different international organizations make demands on the same set 
of domestic politicians. International organizations have widely different criteria for 
evaluating national governments. Often those criteria are different from those of a 
country’s citizens and from each other. Every time a country joins an IGO, its politicians 
must respond to new demands. As a result of international pressures, politicians choose to 
place priorities on policies that are different from the priorities they would have chosen if 
they were only responsive and accountable to their own citizens. Conceptualized as a 
multiple principals-common agent problem, the conflict in incentives for the agent causes 
an increase in agency loss.2  
This argument is consistent with the literature arguing that international influence 
over the policy choices made by domestic politicians is growing. It has now reached a 
point where we can no longer understand politics within countries without also 
comprehending linkages between national governments and international actors that seek 
influence over them. This “internationalization of domestic politics” affects the policies 
of different countries differently depending upon institutional contexts that affect the 
incentives of politicians (Hawkins et al.). Here we explore differences in effects on 
governance due to variations in level of democracy.  
In the following sections, we explain why multiple international pressures could 
lead to extra difficulties in controlling politicians, link difficulties in controlling 
politicians to reduced domestic political accountability, and connect political 
accountability with public policies. Then in the empirical part of the paper we apply our 
theoretical expectations to show that increasing national participation in 
intergovernmental organizations is associated with a decline in the quality of governance, 
especially for less democratic countries.  
 
Theory, Previous Research and Hypotheses 
Following Fukuyama (2013), we use the term “domestic governance” to refer a 
government's ability to make and enforce rules. A popular approach is to conceptualize 
                                                        
2 Among the related problems are the democratic deficit, representation, transparency, 
cost-efficiency, expediency, public participation in decision-making, and the 
accountability of international organizations. 
governance in a principal-agent framework and, within such framework, “the quality of 
governance is different from the ends that governance is meant to fulfill. That is, 
governance is about the performance of agents in carrying out the wishes of principals, 
and not about the goals that principals set.” (Fukuyama 2013: 350, see also Rothstein and 
Teorell  2008). Domestic governance is improved when there are fewer incentives for 
politicians to engage in venal, greedy, corrupt, and rent-seeking methods of governing 
(Bueno de Mesquita et al 2003: 485). Better governance requires better accountability. 
We contribute to the literature on governance by emphasizing the potentially negative 
consequences of competition between international organizations and citizens for 
influence over domestic politicians. We make several simplifying assumptions. First, we 
assume that both citizens and the international actors have a stake in the actions of 
domestic politicians. Second, both citizens and the international actors can impose certain 
rewards and costs on domestic politicians. Third, for simplicity we assume that all 
citizens share the same objectives. However, the objectives of each international actor are 
different from those of the citizens, and are different from those of other international 
actors. Correspondingly, with some exceptions, international actors and citizens have 
distinctive criteria for evaluating domestic politicians. 
Under such assumptions, the control of domestic politicians can be analyzed as a 
common agency model where an agent (in this case, a domestic politician) performs 
multiple tasks while serving multiple principals. Each principal differs in the relative 
value it places on each task (Bernheim and Whinston 1986; Holmstrom and Milgrom 
1991), and every principal encourages the politician to pour her effort into the activities it 
values the most, and thus discourages her from performing tasks more valuable to other 
principals. Encouraging effort on one task could crowd out the effort on other tasks 
(Dewatripont et al. 2000). In consequence, the number of objectives (such as health, 
security, environmental protection and trade) that a politician must pursue is negatively 
related to her incentives to exert high effort on any particular task. 
Sinclair-Desgagné (2001) models a situation with multiple principals and a common 
agent, where the agent faces a set of separate contracts, each one designed to align the 
agent’s preferences with those of a specific principal. Each principal compensates the 
agent for performing certain tasks that are useful to the principal and cost the agent in 
effort. Since the performance is costly to monitor, and because there is uncertainty and 
risk, the principal does not observe the agent’s effort. As a result, no principal ever gets 
first-best compliance from the agent. On top of that, divergent preferences among 
multiple principals who compete for the attention of the single agent produce bilateral 
contracts that deliver even lower incentives to the agent (Sinclair-Desgagné, 2001:11).3  
By extension, when states participate in multiple international agreements, additional 
agency loss for citizens is expected, because participation in each new IGO comes with a 
new set of obligations and a new principal. With the addition of new principals, the 
preferences of citizens become less salient for domestic politicians because the incentives 
citizens might offer now weigh less.  
 The tendency for national politicians to accept supra-national commitments varies 
for different political systems and specific policy areas. Politicians in developing 
countries depend on financial assistance provided by IGOs such as the IMF and World 
Bank, often on a negotiated, and, therefore, conditional basis. According to Keohane 
(2003), increased efforts to expand the benefits that poor countries receive from 
globalization have created an influence effect, making it easier for donor IGOs to hold 
these countries accountable for their actions. In the global world, domestic politicians, 
                                                        
3 Formally defined, in this context, the “lower incentives” mean that the agent’s overall 
payoff would turn out to be relatively insensitive to the outcome. 
particularly in the executive branch, are subject to increasing pressure and demands from 
institutions of supranational or international bodies that have a right to be heard and, 
indeed, the authority to insist (Mair 2013). The “agents may sometimes even be 
persuaded that they owe a greater duty of accountability to these ‘external’ principals 
than to their own domestic principals” (Mair: 145). 
An important clarification has been introduced by Keohane (2003:140) who referred 
to the actor holding an agent accountable as a “principal” when the accountability 
relationship had been institutionalized, and to the actor seeking to hold an agent 
accountable as a “would-be principal”. In many policy areas, international organizations 
are mere “would-be-principles” vis-à-vis national governments, but the global trend is 
towards the increasing relevance of external actors for domestic political choices. And 
the developing institutions of multilateralism already hold nation states accountable on 
some issues (Keohane (2003).  
Different disciplines of the social sciences have provided theoretical and empirical 
support for the argument that the presence of multiple principals reduces an agent’s 
accountability to some (or all) principals. Among studies most relevant for our purposes 
are analyses of the accountability of international organizations to their member states as 
a common agency problem (Hawkins et al. 2006). Accountability also features as an 
important theme in the debate on the EU’s democratic deficit (Gustavsson et al 2009). 
Various versions of the common agency argument have been used to explain the decline 
of domestic political accountability of politicians to their citizens because of increasing 
responsiveness to the demands of the European Union (Dehousse 2008; Hix 2002; 
Lindstädt et al 2012; Scharpf 2013). More generally, Papadopoulos (2010) argues that the 
trend towards greater international cooperation and the rise of multi-level governance can 
have negative consequences for domestic democratic accountability. 
Here we take the next step and argue that, to the degree that international 
governmental organizations can sanction or reward policy choices of domestic 
politicians, IGOs compete with citizens to hold domestic politicians accountable. This 
competition increases agency loss in the relationship between what citizens want and 
what politicians and bureaucrats do. Some agency loss is inevitable. The magnitude of 
agency loss increases when politicians are unwilling to pursue the good governance 
objectives their citizens prefer and/or when they have difficulty handling the 
simultaneous demands of multiple principals. The competition among international 
principals and between international principals and domestic citizens undermines the 
quality of domestic governance. The disruptive effects are likely to increase with time 
and with the increase in the each state’s number of IGO memberships.  
The negative effects are also likely to be strongest in less democratic countries. 
Politicians in states that are more democratic and economically advanced created most 
IGOs. Thus, the design and mission of IGOs are more likely to be consistent with what 
those states wanted (politicians and citizens) wanted, at least at the time of IGO creation. 
Most importantly, democratic states are better equipped to handle unanticipated 
international demands without excessively sacrificing their accountability to their own 
citizens. A country with a high quality democracy also has high quality institutions 
linking citizens to their politicians such as regular free and fair elections and a free press. 
Thus, the disruptive effects of more IGO memberships are expected to be weakest for 
countries with higher levels of democracy.   
Since better governance requires better accountability, we hypothesize that (1) 
joining a greater number of international governmental organization (IGOs) has a 
negative impact on domestic governance, and (2) the number of IGOs has a stronger 
negative effect on domestic governance in non-democracies. 
 
Empirical Test 
Sample and Time Period: The sample for this study consists of up to 129 
countries--all of the countries for which we have data for all variables for the period of 
1985-2005. The unit of analysis is the country-year. In the selection of the time period 
and the countries, we are constrained by the availability of data for our main independent 
variable, the total number of IGO memberships.  
Dependent Variable:  For the quality of domestic governance, we use the Quality 
of Government  Index, a variable included in the International Country Risk Guide 
(ICRG).4  This index is the average value of the ICRG variables Corruption, Law and 
Order, and Bureaucracy Quality, scaled from 0 to 1. Higher values indicate higher 
quality of government (Quality of Government Institute Dataset 2016). The Quality of 
Government Index (provided by the ICRG) has a number of advantages: it covers the 
longest period of time and comes from a single source, which claims to maintain 
consistency and seeks to minimize over-time variation in the meaning of the scale. Other 
studies have used the ICRG data as indicators of the quality of governance, making the 
results of our analysis comparable with theirs (Knack 2001; Knack and Rahman 2007; 
Bäck and Hadenius 2008; Charron and Lapuente 2010; Fortunato  and Panizza 2015; 
Sundell 2015; Heller et al 2016). 
As a robustness check, we will employ several alternative indicators of the quality 
of governance provided by the QOG Institute (2016): the Control of Corruption Indicator 
developed by the World Bank (Model 8, Table 3); the Government Effectiveness 
Indicator also made available by the World Bank (Model 9, Table 3); the Political 
Corruption Index provided by the Varieties of Democracy Project (Model 10, Table 3); 
and the Public Sector Corruption Index by the Varieties of Democracy Project (Model 
                                                        
4 https://www.prsgroup.com/about-us/our-two-methodologies/icrg 
11, Table 3). More IGO memberships were expected to be negatively related to the 
Quality of Government Index, the Control of Corruption Indicator, the Government 
Effectiveness Indicator, but positively associated with the Political Corruption Index and 
the Public Sector Corruption Index.  Estimations using all of these alternative dependent 
variables support our theoretical expectations.  
  Our main independent variable is the Total Number of IGO Memberships held by 
each country in each year. This variable was calculated based on Pevehouse et al. (2004). 
We lag the main independent variable by five years, because we assume that it takes time 
for the changes in the IGO membership to effect measurable change. This use of a five-
year lag is admittedly ad hoc, but it is consistent with the approach of Bueno de Mesquita 
et al. (2005), who argue that it takes about 5 years for changes in institutions to improve 
governance. The five-year lag also helps to address questions about possible endogeneity 
and directional causality. Using a three-year lag does not change our substantive results. 
To test the expectation that the negative effect of membership in IGOs is weaker 
in more democratic countries, we create an interaction variable by multiplying the main 
independent variable (Total Number of IGO Memberships) on the level of 
Institutionalized Democracy (the zero to ten indicator from Polity IV). A substantial 
interaction effect between these two variables would yield a statistically significant result 
in the following model: 
 
Indicator of Government Quality t = 
 α + β1 IGOst-5 + β2 Democracyt + β3 IGOst-5*Democracyt + βXt + 
et , 
 
where X is a vector of controls 
Control Variables: Our control variables are consistent with previous studies of 
the quality of governance. All control variables demonstrate statistical significance at 
least in some model specifications. The level of Institutionalized Democracy is the most 
widely used explanatory and control variable in previous studies of the quality of 
governance. Like many other scholars, we assess the level of democracy using the Polity 
IV Institutionalized Democracy indicator. To see if the level of democracy affects the 
quality of governance in a nonlinear way, we include the squared term of the 
institutionalized democracy indicator as well (Bäck and Hadenius 2008; Charron and 
Lapuente 2010). In an alternative specification we control for the robustness of our 
results by using a dichotomous measure of democracy (see online Appendix).  
Previous studies also reported that the logarithm of GDP per capita and the British 
legal heritage were positively correlated with the quality of governance (Treisman 2000). 
The reliance on natural resources, on the other hand, contributed to the decline of the 
quality of governance and increased corruption (La Porta et al 1999; Aidt, 2003; 
Pellegrini and Gerlagh 2008). Ethnic fragmentation also negatively affected the quality of 
government (Mauro 1995). Overall, the estimated coefficients of the control variables in 
our analysis either are statistically insignificant or are consistent with previous findings. 
 
Results 
We show the effect of membership in IGOs on the quality of governance using 
four alternative statistical models. They all produce very similar results that fully support 
our theoretical expectations. We start with a cross-sectional analysis for three periods: the 
beginning of the available data (in 1985), the midpoint (1995), and the endpoint of 
available observations (2005). The dependent variable is the Quality of Government 
Index. The independent variables of main theoretical interest, as noted above, are the 
Total Number of IGO Memberships operating within each country in each year and the 
interaction term with the level of Institutionalized Democracy. As Table 1 reports, the 
sign of the Total Number of IGO Memberships is always negative and is statistically 
significant for 1995 and 2005. In all three equations, the coefficients of the interaction 
term have the expected (positive) signs and are statistically significant at the .05 level or 
better (Equations 1, 2 and 3).  
Second, we study the relationship between the Quality of Government Index and 
our main independent variables by focusing on the within-country variation as captured 
through time-series cross-section fixed effects regression. It incorporates information 
from 115 countries for the period of 1985—2005 (Model 4, Table 2). The fixed effects 
estimation reduces the likelihood of omitted variable bias since it controls for the possible 
effects of both observable and unobservable time-constant variables. However, because 
of that, in fixed effects models the time-invariant explanatory variables must be excluded. 
In order to control explicitly for various combinations of variables that the literature has 
identified as important we supplement the fixed effects analysis with two random effects 
time-series cross-sectional estimations (Model 5 and 6, Table 2).   
Section Models: 1985, 1995 and 2005 
 (1) (2) (3) 
VARIABLES Quality of 
Government 
Index 1985 
Quality of 
Government 
Index 1995 
Quality of 
Government 
Index 2005 
    
Total Number of IGO 
Memberships,  5-year Lag 
-0.002 
(0.001) 
-0.005** 
(0.002) 
-0.002** 
(0.0009) 
    
Interactive Term: IGOs * 
Democracy 
0.0007** 
(0.0002) 
0.0007** 
(0.0002) 
0.0003** 
(0.0001) 
    
Institutionalized Democracy -0.04* -0.08*** -0.06*** 
 (0.03) (0.02) (0.01) 
    
Institutionalized Democracy 
Squared 
0.0001 
(0.003) 
0.006*** 
(0.002) 
0.005*** 
(0.001) 
    
GDP per capita (constant 
2005 US$), log 
0.05** 
(0.02) 
0.06*** 
(0.01) 
0.07*** 
(0.009) 
    
Total natural resources rents -0.003* -0.004** -0.003*** 
(% of GDP) (0.001) (0.001) (0.0005) 
    
Economic Globalization 0.003 0.0006 0.001 
 (0.002) (0.001) (0.0009) 
    
British Legal Origin 0.06 0.03 0.06** 
 (0.04) (0.03) (0.02) 
    
Constant 0.1 0.4*** 0.03 
 (0.2) (0.1) (0.08) 
    
Observations 84 99 116 
R-squared 0.596 0.687 0.761 
Robust standard errors in parentheses 
*** p<0.001, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1 
Notes: Dependent variable is ‘Quality of Government’ scaled so that higher scores 
indicate better government performance (0-1). 
  
Table 2. Dependent Variable: ICRG Indicator of Quality of Government. Cross 
Section Time Series Models 1985-2005 
 (4) (5) (6) (7) 
VARIABLES Fixed 
Effect 
Model 
Random 
Effect Model 
I 
Random 
Effect Model 
II 
GLS 
Model 
AR(1) 
     
Total Number of IGO 
Memberships,  5-year Lag 
-0.001*** 
(0.0003) 
-0.001*** 
(0.0003) 
-0.002*** 
(0.0003) 
-
0.0009*** 
(0.0002) 
     
Interactive Term: IGOs * 
Democracy 
0.0001*** 
(0.00003) 
0.0002*** 
(0.00003) 
0.0002*** 
(0.00003) 
0.00006** 
(0.00003) 
     
Institutionalized Democracy -0.008* -0.01*** -0.007 0.0006 
 (0.004) (0.004) (0.004) (0.003) 
     
Institutionalized Democracy 
Squared 
0.0001 
(0.0005) 
0.0009** 
(0.0004) 
0.0002 
(0.0004) 
-0.00007 
(0.0003) 
     
GDP per capita (constant 2005 
US$), log 
0.07*** 
(0.02) 
0.09*** 
(0.007) 
0.07*** 
(0.008) 
0.07*** 
(0.005) 
     
Total natural resources rents (% 
of GDP) 
-0.002*** 
(0.0005) 
-0.002*** 
(0.0004) 
-0.002*** 
(0.0004) 
-
0.0008*** 
(0.0002) 
     
Economic Globalization -0.0004 -0.0002 0.001** 0.0004* 
 (0.0004) (0.0004) (0.0004) (0.0002) 
British Legal Origin   0.02 0.03** 
   (0.02) (0.01) 
Ethnic Fractionalization   0.02 -0.01 
   (0.04) (0.03) 
Year   -0.004*** -0.003*** 
   (0.0006) (0.0005) 
     
Dummies for Global Regions   Included Included 
     
Constant 0.2 -0.06 8.3*** 5.9*** 
 (0.1) (0.06) (1.1) (1.0) 
     
Observations 2,079 2,079 2,079 2,077 
     
Number of Countries 115 115 115 113 
Standard errors in parentheses 
*** p<0.001, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1 
Notes: Dependent variable is ‘Quality of Government’ scaled so that higher scores 
indicate better government performance (0-1).  
For the random effects regressions we present the results with the two nested 
groups of controls. We start by controlling only for variables that change over time in our 
sample - the level of Institutionalized Democracy, the level of Institutionalized 
Democracy Squared, the log of real GDP per capita, the degree to which the economy 
depends upon the extraction of natural resources, and the degree of economic 
globalization (Model 5, Table 2). Next, we add controls for variables that are time-
invariant in our sample: ethno-linguistic fractionalization, British legal origin, and the 
dummy indicators for the world’s regions. We also add a year counter as a way to control 
for trends in the independent variable (Model 6, Table 2). Finally, we run time-series 
cross-section GLS regression with correction for panel-specific AR(1) autocorrelation 
and heteroskedastic error structure, while including all control variables (Model 7, Table 
2).  
The results of time-series cross-section regressions are fully consistent with our 
theoretical expectations. The sign on the Total Number of IGO Memberships is always 
negative and statistically significant; the sign on the interactive term with democracy is 
always positive and statistically significant. The signs of estimated coefficients of the 
control variables are consistent with the results reported by the previous studies and are 
statistically significant in most cases, with the notable exception of the Ethnic 
Fractionalization coefficient, which is not statistically significant in Models 6 and 7.  
 
Robustness Checks and Substantive Importance  
We replicate our full GLS model for the four alternative dependent variables as 
descried above, in order to verify the robustness of our findings. Empirical research on 
the quality of governance has employed numerous and diverse indicators.5 Though the 
concepts purportedly captured by those indicators vary, there is a high cross-sectional 
                                                        
5 Most empirical studies rely on perception based measures. 
correlation among indicators. As a rule, the results of previous research on the quality of 
government hold up even when alternative measures of the concept are used.  
As shown in Table 3, this is true for our empirical results as well.  Two measures 
commonly used in previous research come from the World Bank’s Worldwide 
Governance Indicators: Control of Corruption (Model 8) and Government Effectiveness 
(Model 9). These measures range from -2.5 to 2.5, with higher scores representing higher 
quality of governance. These measures were developed by combining information from 
experts and surveys. However, these variables have observations for a shorter period of 
time: 1995-2005. We also use two relatively new variables from the data set assembled 
by Variety of Democracy (V-Dem) Project as alternative dependent variables. First, we 
use Political Corruption Index by V-Dem based on expert answers to the questions: how 
pervasive is political corruption in specific government institutions and activities? The 
index is arrived at by taking the average of (a) public sector corruption index; (b) 
executive corruption index; (c) the indicator for legislative corruption; and (d) the 
indicator for judicial corruption (Model 10). Finally, we present separately the results the 
Public Sector Corruption Index by V-Dem as the dependent variable (Model 11).6 The V-
Dem variables have observations for 1985-2005 and range from 0 (least corrupt) to 100 
(most corrupt). The regressions based on alternative dependent variables produce very 
similar results.   
  
                                                        
6 Regressions with other measures of corruption by V-Democracy as dependent variables 
produce similar results. 
Table 3. Robustness Check using Alternative Dependent Variable: GLS AR(1) 
Cross Section Time Series Models  
 (8) (9) (10) (11) 
VARIABLES Control of 
Corruption 
World Bank 
1996-2005 
Government 
Effectiveness 
World Bank 
1996-2005 
Political 
Corruption 
V-Dem Index 
1985-2005 
Public Sector 
Corruption V-
Dem Index 
1985-2005 
     
Total Number of IGO 
Memberships,  5-year 
Lag 
-0.003** 
(0.0009) 
-0.004*** 
(0.0009) 
0.0009*** 
(0.0002) 
0.001*** 
(0.0002) 
     
Interactive Term: 
IGOs * Democracy 
0.0004** 
(0.0002) 
0.0004** 
(0.0001) 
-0.00008*** 
(0.00002) 
-0.0001*** 
(0.00002) 
     
Institutionalized 
Democracy 
-0.08*** 
(0.01) 
-0.06*** 
(0.01) 
0.003 
(0.002) 
0.007** 
(0.002) 
     
Institutionalized 
Democracy Squared 
0.01*** 
(0.001) 
0.009*** 
(0.001) 
-0.0005** 
(0.0002) 
-0.0010*** 
(0.0002) 
     
GDP per capita 
(constant 2005 US$), 
log 
0.2*** 
(0.02) 
0.3*** 
(0.01) 
-0.08*** 
(0.004) 
-0.08*** 
(0.004) 
     
Total natural 
resources rents (% of 
GDP) 
-0.010*** 
(0.0009) 
-0.009*** 
(0.0008) 
0.0010*** 
(0.0001) 
0.001*** 
(0.0002) 
     
Economic 
Globalization 
0.01*** 0.008*** -0.0006*** -0.0003** 
 (0.0010) (0.0008) (0.0001) (0.0001) 
     
British Legal Origin -0.03 0.06** -0.04*** -0.02* 
 (0.04) (0.03) (0.006) (0.009) 
     
Ethnic 
Fractionalization 
-0.007 0.2** 0.10*** 0.09*** 
 (0.08) (0.05) (0.02) (0.02) 
     
Year -0.02*** -0.01*** 0.004*** 0.004*** 
 (0.003) (0.002) (0.0003) (0.0003) 
Dummies for Global 
Regions 
  Included Included 
     
Constant 34*** 21*** -7.1*** -6.8*** 
 (5.0) (4.2) (0.5) (0.6) 
     
Observations 875 875 2,295 2,295 
Number of Countries 129 129 125 125 
Standard errors in parentheses 
*** p<0.001, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1 
  
Figures 1 helps to evaluate the substantive effects of the number of IGOs in which 
a nation participates conditional on its level of democracy.  Figure 1 shows the marginal 
effects of IGO number of IGO memberships by the level of democracy: Lowest (score = 
0), Moderate (score = 5) and Highest (score = 10).  The figure illustrates that the negative 
effect of multiple IGO memberships on the quality of government is the highest for non-
democracies and is significantly smaller for “perfect” democracies. For example, a 
hypothetical change in the Total Number of IGO Memberships from the minimum (of 0) 
to the maximum (of 150) results in the decline of the Quality of Government Index from 
0.6 to 0.43 if the democracy level is 0, but only from 0.6 to 0.55 if democracy level is 10. 
See the online appendix for Figures 2-5, which show similar results for the alternative 
indicators of the quality of governance used in Table 3. 
 
 
Figure 1 
 
 
 
  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Conclusion 
Rapid economic, political and social globalization has led to an increase in the 
scope and intensity of international pressures on all nations. This is a fact of modern life, 
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but there is debate over whether it is a good or bad thing for most of the world’s citizens. 
Though there are dissident voices, the prevailing account in the literature is that 
international collaboration encourages domestic politicians to adopt policies that lead to a 
wide variety of good outcomes including improved domestic governance (Bauhr and 
Nasiritousi 2012). 
We have presented a more nuanced picture by noting that a particular type of 
international cooperation—an increasing membership in IGOs —is likely to have a mix 
of good and bad consequences for member states. On the positive side, IGOs help 
member states to solve coordination problems and to deal with rapidly changing global 
demands and expectations in technology, the economy, and the natural environment. 
They also help transmit international norms and standards. Yet, as we have shown, 
participation in multiple IGOs also has a disruptive effect on domestic governance—in 
particular for less democratic countries. 
Our theoretical expectations about the negative influence of multiple IGO 
memberships on the accountability of domestic politicians (the agents) to their citizens 
follows directly from the established results in the principal-agent literature. The loss of 
domestic accountability we identify is a negative externality that inevitably arises when 
many international actors try to influence national governments.  Even if joining any 
particular IGO is beneficial, the competing demands of multiple IGO memberships would 
still undermine accountability of domestic governance. What we emphasize is the cost 
aspect to such benefits: increased activities of the IGOs unintentionally make it more 
difficult for citizens to control political incumbents--especially in less democratic nations. 
Such nations face a trade-off between the advantages of international cooperation and the 
negative influence of adding international principals on domestic accountability.  The 
decline in domestic accountability is likely to contribute to a decline in quality of 
domestic governance and our empirical analysis supports such theoretical expectations. 
It is important to note, that our theoretical prediction concerns domestic 
accountability loss and decline in the quality of governance, but not necessarily a decline 
in all policy outcomes. The strength of the disruptive effect on specific policy outcomes 
depends on the balance of costs and benefits, which are likely to vary for different policy 
areas and types of countries. We have emphasized the costs of international cooperation, 
which, depending upon the policy area, may or may not outweigh the benefits from 
participation.  
Previous research has demonstrated, for example, that there are benefits from 
international cooperation for stopping the spread of epidemic disease, for providing better 
sanitation and improving environmental quality (Frank, Hironak and Schofer, 2000; 
Spilker 2012; Clavier and de Leeuw 2013). For other policy areas such as improving 
human rights practices and stimulating economic development (Abouharb and 
Cingranelli 2007 Bourguignon and Sundberg 2007; Knack and Rahman 2007) the 
findings are less conclusive. Our theoretical argument and findings suggest that the 
balance of the positive and negative effects of international cooperation is likely to vary 
for different policies and types of countries. After more findings accumulate, we can 
refine the theory to better anticipate the characteristics of policies and nations where the 
disruptive effects are likely to be greatest.  
Increasing international cooperation, pressures and conditionality are 
unavoidable, so the decline in domestic accountability is likely to continue. Our findings 
suggest that the negative consequences for domestic accountability are strongest for less 
democratic countries. In other words, the negative consequences of international 
cooperation we have identified are not evenly distributed among nations. This finding 
implies that more democratic countries should develop strategies to reduce those negative 
consequences for their less democratic counterparts. One possibility would be to make it 
harder for domestic politicians in less democratic countries to shirk their responsibilities 
to their own citizens by blaming international organizations for their lack of efforts. 
Another possibility would be to directly compensate less democratic countries for the 
declines in policy outcomes likely to result from the loss in domestic accountability due 
to increasing international cooperation.  
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